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Abstract: Marx’s approach to questions of justice and morality are captured by this
metaphilosophical position, whereby Marx rejects an understanding of philosophical inquiry as
the pursuit of foundations and universality. Philosophical justifications are, in the last instance,
products of a particular form of society and production. Rather than abandoning the basic idea of
human moral equality, the radical historicist approach allows the philosopher to make the
Marxist progression from merely understanding the world toward changing it and moving it
closer toward a moral horizon.
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Young Americans increasingly view capitalism as not only wrong but also temporary
(Ehrenfreund 2016; Goldberg 2017; Steverman 2017). A recent survey finds 51-percent of 18- to
29-year-olds do not support capitalism (Harvard University 2016). According to the survey’s
polling director, millennials think capitalism is unfair and leaves people out despite hard work.
What, if anything, can restore their sense of fairness?
The Marxist metaphilosophical critique of justice offers a compelling approach to restore this.
After explaining what this approach is, I argue that Leninist thought constitutes an application
and extension of Marx’s metaphilosophy. Leninism embraces the relationship between norm and
critique, which produces a successful synthesis of normative militancy and ruthless critique.
Furthermore, I think the contemporary moment necessitates such a militant critique. The radical
historicist critique represents an approach to deriving what ought to be from what is without
either deconstructing our entire normative foundation (i.e. what ought to be) or unreflectively
projecting bourgeois ideology (i.e. what is). Lenin’s synthesis of normative commitment and
empirical critique, I argue, is what makes his analysis so trenchant.
Marxist Metaphilosophy
Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism is both empirical and normative. Empirically, it shows
capitalism results in crisis; normatively, it argues capitalism is an unjust and immoral system of
exploitation and domination. The inevitability of the proletarian revolution, however, does not
rely on these normative considerations. Instead, it is the social and material contradictions of
capitalism, the observable considerations, which are decisive in its rupture.
Although capitalism inevitably ends, we must question if the next historical step is normatively
preferable. Indeed, the roles of justice and morality in Marx’s normative critique of capitalism
constitute anything but a consensus (c.f. Brenkert 1980; Greaves 1994; Lukacs 1972; Lukes
2012; Tucker, 1969; Veer 1973; Wood 1972). Marxism’s normative ambiguity is an expression
of a more fundamental ambiguity — that is, the relationship between norm and critique.
Marxist metaphilosophy, I suggest, permits us to understand this ambiguity. This
metaphilosophical position represents a shift in framework from philosophical justification to
theoretical inquiry. Theoretical inquiry focuses upon the extent to which society is or is not
just/moral based upon some normative principle (West 1991). The radical historicist approach is
to, “stop doing philosophy and to begin to describe, explain, and ultimately change the world”
(West 1991, 170). Marx’s metaphilosophy shifts our focus from philosophic justification (i.e.
what is right or wrong) to theoretical inquiry (i.e. what is real, what is not, and what we can do to
struggle based on that analysis).
By acknowledging the historical situatedness and social specificity of socialist normative
demands, Marxism can also maintain a militant critique that our cause is correct. When Marx’s
interpreters attempt to reconcile his historicism with universal moral notions, they fall prey to
very precise mode of philosophical inquiry that Marxist metaphilosophy avoids. Marx is far less
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interested in the content and justification of moral norms and notions of justice than he is with
their social origin and function. By empirically evaluating the unfolding history of class struggle,
Marxism argues the struggle to free workers from the subjection of the ruling class advances real
conditions of universality. In this way, Marxist metaphilosophy combines empirical observations
and normative ideals by utilizing theoretical inquiry instead of philosophical justification.
Lenin and Marxist Metaphilosophy
Lenin applies and extends Marxist metaphilosophy in his works. His thought uses this approach
to produce possible real-world mechanisms to achieve Marxist ideals. For example, Lenin aptly
expresses a Marxist metaphilosophy during a discussion of the Social Democrats in What is to be
Done?:
He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” tendency in
socialism is nothing more nor less than a new species of opportunism. And if we judge the
people not by the brilliant uniforms they deck themselves in, not by the imposing appellations
they give themselves, but by their actions, and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear
that “freedom of criticism” means freedom for an opportunistic tendency in Social-Democracy,
the freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic reformist party, the freedom to
introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism (Lenin 1966, 56)
Lenin evaluates the principle of “freedom” in light of its opportunistic and bourgeois
implications. The argument is not a philosophic justification of true freedom. Rather, the
argument is that “freedom of criticism” is harmful to the advancement of socialism and
conducive to bourgeois ideology. The argument leaves aside the normative justificatory
questions to focus on how to effectively critique the contemporary moment to advance the
struggle for socialism.
One of Lenin’s most radical and subversive critiques is in The State and Revolution. This
work rejects capitalism and all Western forms of politics. His denunciation of “the state,”
however, is only of the bourgeois state. Class domination will always rule a state. As capitalism
constitutes a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the socialist state constitutes a dictatorship of the
proletariat. Lenin does not reject this normative foundation of the state. Instead, he supports the
proletarian state because it serves the struggle for what is real.
In these examples, Lenin’s uses the metaphilosophical approach to unite objective scientific
inquiry with historically situated partisanship. The subjectivity and transferability of human
knowledge are fundamental and persistent issues. How one approaches this epistemological
question holds implications for how they approach politics. On the one hand, politics understood
as a fundamentally subjective and non-transferrable form of knowledge is likely to turn to
decentralized, deliberative, and communicative paths of transformation. On the other hand, an
understanding of politics as, at least partially, an objective transferrable enterprise is more likely
to embrace a decisive militant posture that sees value in centralization. By applying and
extending a Marxist metaphilosophy, Lenin falls into the latter of these two camps.
Lenin’s Insight for the Contemporary Moment
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Lenin unites a scientific perspective (implying universality and impartiality) with a partisan
class-based perspective (implying particularity and partiality). In merging these dichotomies, he
embodies the quintessential radical historicist move that Cornel West identifies — that is, the
rejection of the opposition between the universal and particular (1991). Lenin offers an
application and extension of Marxist metaphilosophy by establishing a substantive politics from
Marxism.
Lenin’s militant partisanship, however, presents a paradox within the modern/postmodern and
critical/normative dichotomies. Its militancy is due to his objective scientific approach. Free of
the bourgeois ideology, he examines what actually is at this moment and why it is. Leninism,
however, is equally ideological and partisan. To smash capitalism requires that we know what
ought to be. Holding both positions appears paradoxical. Unraveling this paradox, however,
allows us to see how Leninism overcomes issues facing postmodern thought.
A postmodern democratic theorist may agree with the ideals of Leninism (e.g. equality), but
reject the political project; this is because the way to achieve these ideals amounts to an antidemocratic government due to the vanguard party. Postmodernism, however, struggles to
achieve the ideals of Leninism. This is because its principled commitments to subjectivity and
moral equality eventually conflict with one another. If knowledge and norms are an
indeterminate web of intersubjectivity, whatever arises out of this indeterminacy has normative
value – even a Nazi resurgence.
Iris Marion Young’s postmodern critique of unifying discourse, however, does not intend such
implications. Young (1981) has a strong substantive sense of justice and injustice. I think she
rejects Nazism as a valid subjective orientation. Young’s assumption is that democracy will
somehow play out to generate and sustain conditions conducive to universal human flourishing;
in his time, Lenin argued that this is not the case. Eagleton (2007) shows that Leninism
consistently expresses, rather than vulgarizes, democratic sensibilities. Given the historical
context (what is), how to achieve these normative ideals (what ought to be) require treatments
(e.g. the vanguard party) that may appear to violate these ideals. Lenin’s argument has the
principled commitment, however, that is lacking in Young’s (1981) thought. Thus, he is able to
reject Nazism and other injustices that do not empirically serve the normative goal.
Eagleton’s (2007) critique of postmodernism, via Lenin, informs my radical historicist critique of
Young. The basic moral ideal of human equality — and the normative orientation that follows
from this ideal — is, if not incontestable, a widely accepted ideal. While equality is part of the
ideological fabric of capitalism, ideological invocations of it do not suggest a universal rejection
of human equality. As the radical historicist approach suggests, the proper response to such
ideological invocations does not lie in a counter-assertion of a more enlightened, less ideological,
and greater universal normative formulation (as Young offers despite her reluctance to invoke
the universal).
Rather, the proper and effective theoretical treatment of ideology lies in its rigorous analysis of
ideology itself. How does the idea of human equality factor into capitalist ideology? How is it
that hollow allusions to liberty and equality effectively veil the evils of capitalism in the eyes of
many people? How can theorists bring to light how hollow and empty such ideological
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pronouncements actually are? What are the practical steps needed to transcend this narrow
horizon of bourgeois morality? The radical historicist approach allows us to leave behind the
philosophical quibbles over whether or not elements of bourgeois ideology are philosophically
justifiable.
Far from implying specific techniques, the radical historicist approach implies the basic — yet
profound — orientation toward struggle. The contemporary Marxist must cut through
capitalism’s disorienting ideological fog. It is precisely the radical historicist approach, which
sharpens the blade of its critique. Marxist metaphilosophy and praxis synthesizes ruthless
critique with principled moral commitment. As Mao Tse Tung (1964) famously put it: “Dare to
Struggle and Dare to Win.”
Conclusion
The relationship between critique and norm, and the fundamental epistemological ambiguities
which underlie it, remain central points of tension and debate. The conversation around the
Marxist critique of justice is instructive because its radical historicist approach to the topic can
strengthen a modern and postmodern approach. It necessitates an ideological reflection that is
missing in modern approaches. The radical historicist approach is likely to steer one away from
merely reproducing capitalist subjectivity and ideology. Furthermore, this approach is
compelling due to its rooting of theoretical inquiry, which is missing in postmodern approaches.
The radical historicist approach, therefore, avoids the pitfalls of embracing either premature
social reconciliation, on the one hand, or a defeatist attitude toward the idea of a common good,
on the other. Marxist metaphilosophy allows us to justify anti-capitalist socialist norms without
either blind amoral acceptance or appealing to highly abstracted notions of justice and morality
as the final court of appeal.
The radical historicist approach offers a compelling conceptual apparatus for addressing the
problem of justice in the context of deep class divisions and socio-political polarization. It
addresses millennials’ concern of the unfairness within capitalism. Fairness (and therefore
justice) may not exist in this system. Through a combination of ripe historical conditions and
revolutionary theory and practice, global capitalism is subject to challenge and change. This
approach suggests and supports the need for a militant and ruthlessly critical fight against
capitalism and all the violations of human equality. Today — with the resurgence of white
supremacist terrorism, capitalism at a dead end, racist lynching by police, our environment in
irreversible degradation, our prisons filled, and schools abandoned —such militant struggle is not
only needed but needed urgently.
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